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CONTENTS

	Page
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2567)	1
Opening statement by the President	1
Expression of welcome to the new members and thanks to the outgoing members	1
Expression of thanks to the retiring President	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
Letter dated 28 January 1985 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16911)	1

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2567th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 30 January 1985, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Claude de KÉMOULARIA (France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Burkina Faso, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Madagascar, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2567)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. Letter dated 28 January 1985 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16911)

The meeting was called to order at 3.40 p.m.

Opening statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT: (*interpretation from French*): Members will note that the chamber has been equipped so that they can view documents on video tapes. I owe them an explanation. I have been informed by the representative of Chad that he intends during his statement to show certain documents on video tapes. In keeping with past practice, as President of the Council I have decided to authorize the presentation of those documents, and I have given the necessary instructions for the technical arrangements to be made.

Expression of welcome to the new members and thanks to the outgoing members

2. The PRESIDENT: (*interpretation from French*): As this is the first time the Council has met this year in a public meeting, I should like to extend my best wishes to all the members here. I hope that we will all pursue our work in a spirit of co-operation and thus contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security.

3. It is with special pleasure that I extend a welcome to the new non-permanent members of the Council that have been elected for a two-year term, namely, Australia, Denmark, Madagascar, Thailand and Trinidad and Tobago. I am sure I express the views of all the members of the Council when I say that we welcome their participation in our work. We have no doubt that they will make a useful contribution to our search for solutions to the complex problems facing the Council within the framework of its important responsibilities.

4. Also on behalf of the Council, I should like to express my gratitude to the outgoing members for their important contribution to our work. The representatives of Malta, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Zimbabwe have won our esteem and our friendship, and I am sure we shall continue to work with them fruitfully.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

5. The PRESIDENT: (*interpretation from French*): On behalf of the Council I should like to pay a special tribute to my predecessor, Mr. Ahmed Tawfik Khalil, representative of Egypt, who conducted the Council's work in December with great talent and effectiveness.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 28 January 1985 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16911)

6. The PRESIDENT: (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya requesting that they be permitted to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lassou (Chad) and Mr. Azzarouk (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) took places at the Council table.

7. The PRESIDENT: (*interpretation from French*): This meeting has been convened at the request of the representative of Chad in a letter dated 28 January to the President of the Council [*S/16911*], following another letter he had addressed to the President dated 25 January [*S/16906*].

8. I should also like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/16912, containing the text of a letter dated 28 January, addressed to the President of the Council by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

9. The first speaker on my list is the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad, Mr. Gouara Lassou, to whom I wish to extend a welcome. I invite him to make his statement.

10. Mr. LASSOU (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): Before dealing with the item before the Council, I should like on behalf of my delegation sincerely to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for January and also to thank you for having kindly convened the Council so promptly. My delegation is pleased to see the representative of France, a country with which Chad enjoys fruitful and cordial relations, presiding over the Council at this important time of year. We are sure that under your wise and dedicated leadership, and thanks to your outstanding ability as a veteran statesman and diplomat, the Council will be able to discharge properly its heavy responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.

11. I take this opportunity also to pay a well-deserved tribute to your predecessor, the representative of Egypt, a fraternal and friendly country, for his competence and dynamism.

12. I should like also to extend a cordial welcome to the newly elected members of the Council, namely, Australia, Denmark, Madagascar, Thailand and Trinidad and Tobago, and to wish them all success in the important work awaiting them in the Council.

13. Lastly, I wish to express the profound gratitude of the Chadian people as a whole and of its Government to all the members of the Council for responding so promptly to the appeal which my country, Chad, addressed to them, and thus authorizing me to address the Council.

14. On 27 September 1984, a plot aimed at physically eliminating President Hissein Habré and all the members of the Government was foiled at N'Djamena. That plot was part of a process that Qaddafi has been engaging in for nearly 20 years now in order to fulfil his annexationist goals concerning Chad. A White Paper has been issued on that plot. So as to facilitate understanding of the main purpose of this White Paper, which I have made available in order to have it distributed as an official document of the Security Council, it may be helpful to draw briefly on the background of the Chad-Libya dispute. We have already discussed it at length in the Council in 1983, but it is fitting to recall its main features.

15. Everything began in 1970, only several months after the *coup d'état* against King Idris. Indeed, Qaddafi published an official road map of Libya whose legend indicated that the international frontiers contained therein should not be considered as definitive because they could be changed. I would point out that that map already included as part of Libyan territory the area which the press was later to call the "Aouzou Strip".

16. In 1971, Libya's actual military presence in Chadian territory was detected. It was to be intensified in 1973, and further expanded later. Libya, which occupied 114,000 square kilometres in 1973, now occupies 550,000, in other words, the entire prefecture of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti.

17. Qaddafi's secret dream is the occupation and subjugation of all Chad and the Chadian people, in order thereafter to destabilize the rest of Africa. From the very beginning, the Chadian authorities have tried, in vain, to negotiate with Libya.

18. Qaddaffi's Libya has committed aggression against Chad, occupied it and interfered in its internal affairs. The Libyan screen for the occupation of part of Chadian territory was the stillborn Laval-Mussolini treaty of 1935, called "Treaty of Rome on the settlement of the interests of Italy and France in Africa" [*S/15649, annex VII*]. That treaty never had any legal validity, since there was never any exchange of instruments of ratification between France and Italy. Moreover, when France and Libya later signed, on 10 August 1955, the Treaty of Friendship and Good-Neighbourliness between the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Libya [*ibid., annex X*], they saw fit not to mention the abortive Laval-Mussolini treaty on the list of international instruments recognized by the two parties concerning, among other frontiers, that frontier separating the territories of French Equatorial Africa, that is, Chad, which was still under colonial administration, and independent Libya.

19. Qaddafi's régime tried to improve its image by claiming that between 1951 and 1969 Libya was not truly free and that, accordingly, all decisions were dictated to it by imperialism; that the 1955 agreement was, in Qaddafi's eyes, replete with hypocrisy, its articles ambiguous and, consequently, Libya did not recognize it because it had caused Libya too much harm; that the conventions prior to 1955 did not respond to the aspirations of the Libyan people and that, if one were to take history into account, Libyan territory would extend well beyond its current limits.

20. This most unusual manner in which Qaddafi interprets international law should be a source of grave concern to all States Members of the Organization.

21. Why is it that the Laval-Mussolini treaty—which we have described as stillborn—never entered into force? It is because, as I have already said, the exchange of the instruments of ratification never took place nor was ever to take place because of the wars in Ethiopia and Spain. Indeed, the first article of the title of that stillborn treaty made its entry into force conditional upon the conclusion of a convention concerning Tunisia.

22. Count Ciano, then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, declared on 17 December 1938 that the Treaty of Rome "was neither ratified nor completed and has been overtaken by history".

23. Taking note of this statement, Mr. François Poncet, Ambassador of France to Italy, said, on 23 December 1938:

"While the instruments of ratification could not be exchanged, owing to a postponement of the Tunisian Convention which was to precede that exchange, France is not responsible for appraisal of the circumstances which have led Italy itself to desire that postponement."

24. Moreover, if there was a dispute, it was definitively settled in due course between France and Libya, on the recommendation of the General Assembly on 15 December 1950 by its resolution 392 (V). Pursuant to this resolution, France and Libya concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Good-Neighbourliness of 10 August 1955 to which I have referred. Article 3 of that Treaty provides that:

"The two High Contracting Parties recognize that the frontiers between the territory of Libya, on the one hand, and the territories of Tunisia, Algeria, French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, on the other hand, are those resulting from the international instruments in force on the date of the establishment of the United Kingdom of Libya as defined in the exchange of letters as appended hereto (annex I)."

25. Annex I specifies that the international instruments in force were the Franco-British Convention of 14 June 1898; the Additional Declaration of 21 March 1899 to the aforementioned Convention; the Franco-Italian agreements of 1 November 1902; the Franco-British Convention of 8 September 1919; and the Franco-Italian Arrangement of 12 September 1919 [*ibid., annexes I, II, III, V and VI*].

26. The Franco-Libyan Treaty of 10 August 1955 was ratified by the two High Contracting Parties. The exchange of the letters of ratification took place on 20 January 1957, and the Treaty entered into force on 26 March 1957. It should be borne in mind that the letters exchanged on the day of the signing of the Treaty constituting annexes to it contain detailed and indisputable stipulations concerning the path of the frontier between Chad and Libya.

27. With regard to the foregoing, it is easy to see and understand that Libya's warmongering attitude towards Chad is dictated principally by the annexationist aims of the Tripoli régime against Chad in particular and the rest of Africa in general. Consequently, it is Qaddafi who has been creating frontier problems between Chad and Libya.

28. Chad, which is a poor, land-locked country, hard hit by famine and drought and battered by war, has priorities for its economic and social development and the well-being of its people. While Chad's civilian population is suffering the hardships of drought and dying of hunger, the Government of the Third Republic has been obliged to use a large part of the meagre resources available to Chad to cope with a war imposed on its long-suffering people by the Tripoli régime.

29. Despite everything, the Chadian people, fiercely determined and aware of the need to oppose this aggression, under the enlightened guidance of President Hissein Habré, courageously continues a struggle on two fronts: the war imposed by Libya and drought. An army without a leader cannot win any battle; a people without a guiding hand cannot undertake any large-scale enterprise. If the Chadian people is resisting, as I have said before, it is thanks to the inherent qualities of its President, Hissein Habré. Qaddafi knows this, and he realizes that it is to his disadvantage—and that is what he finds unbearable. For Qaddafi, President Hissein Habré is the main obstacle to his régime's expansionist designs on Chad; for Qaddafi, President Hissein Habré is the man to eliminate by every means.

30. Faced with numerous failures and setbacks in the war in Chad, the international terrorist thought he would succeed by using his favourite weapon: international terrorism.

31. Political terrorism, which respects no morality, no frontiers, no principles and no international norms, should be a source of deep concern to all States Members of the United Nations. Each Member State must do its utmost to oppose, annihilate and render harmless those responsible for international terrorism. I realize that a great deal of effort has been made by countries which cherish peace and justice, but much still remains to be done.

32. Often, the victims of political terrorism are caught off guard, while the criminals, for their part, hide behind the mask of anonymity, thus protecting their own identities and that of their backers. In most cases when the terrorists are identified it is too late to be of any help to their victims. However, thanks particularly to the steady improvement of international co-operation, it has been possible in some cases to prevent the perpetration of acts of terrorism in time. Fortunately for Chad, the suspects were caught red-handed before they had a chance to strike; and that has made it possible to find out who was the true criminal.

33. A long and careful inquiry, conducted with the greatest discretion last September by our security services, made it possible to foil a plot to assassinate President Hissein Habré and all the members of the Government of Chad.

34. The testimony of loyal Chadians who pretended to collaborate with the suspected assassins and a thorough analysis of the explosive device have enabled the Government to establish that Muammar Qaddafi, the leader of international terrorism, is truly the person behind this ignominious plot.

35. What I am about to say summarizes the results of the inquiry by the Chadian Security Services dealing with the human and technical methods used by Qaddafi to satisfy his desire for political hegemony by carrying out a series of assassinations in Chad—an hegemony which he has proved unable to achieve by military action on the ground. The Government of Chad hopes that this preliminary report, which has been made public while inquiries are actually continuing, will serve as a warning to other potential victims of Qaddafi as he presses on with acts of terrorism in the world.

36. On 26 September 1984, security agents, acting on a tip provided by Chadian patriots, searched the house of a Chadian businessman named Ali Hassan Adam. In that search an attaché case made of red vinyl material—very similar to those used by businessmen the world over—was discovered. However, that particular attaché case contained an electronic detonating mechanism and enough explosives to destroy a house. The deposition taken from Ali Hassan Adam showed that he had received that booby-trapped device from a Libyan agent at Kousseri, a town in Cameroon, the other side of the Chari River opposite N'Djamena. The Libyan agent, who called himself Senoussi Abdelsalam, had told Ali that the attaché case contained eavesdropping equipment. Senoussi then asked Ali to place the attaché case in the meeting room of the Chamber of Commerce—the room where the Council of Ministers meets—just before the meeting of the President of the Republic with the members of his Government. This "eavesdropping device"—which was in fact a bomb—was to have been kept by Ali at his home in N'Djamena until Senoussi provided him with further instructions. The Libyan agent showed Ali another attaché case and told him that it contained a radio receiver and a tape-recorder. Senoussi explained that he was using this set of equipment to record the debates of the meeting of the Council of Ministers.

37. After considering the results of the analysis of the bomb to which I have referred, President Hissein Habré and the members of his Government decided to keep that information secret in the hope of luring the Libyan agent Senoussi to N'Djamena, where he and his accomplices could be arrested.

38. Meanwhile, the security forces were instructed to press ahead with their inquiries, which made it absolutely clear that this murderous conspiracy had been fomented by the Libyan Government and its leader, Muammar Qaddafi. Moreover, it proved that several Libyans and experienced foreign technicians were accomplices in this attempted assassination. If successful, that gruesome endeavour was to have brought them a net return of a mere CFAF 30 million, or $67,000.

39. The contents of the attaché case, which were to all appearances so harmless, consisted of six sticks of Semtex-H plastic explosives of Czechoslovak manufacture. Each stick, wrapped in wax paper, contained two and a half kilograms of poweful explosives. The total power of 15 kilograms of plastic explosives would have been enough to destroy a truck and any human being within a distance of seven and a half metres in the open air. Inside a conference room, however, the power of the same explosive charge would have been greatly increased. In fact, a 15-kilo charge of explosives is more than enough to destroy a 6,000-cubic-metre conference room and burst the lungs of every person in that room. The Czechoslovak explosive Semtex-H is widely sold throughout the world and is especially favoured by terrorist groups, which use it for booby-trapped letters. For example, Eduardo Mondlane, the Mozambican patriot, was killed by a booby-trapped package containing Semtex-H. The detonators for the plastic explosive were connected to an ignition device put together from electronic components. The ignition device itself, which was a tube of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) 29 centimetres long and 4 centimetres in diameter, was powered by an ordinary 1.5-volt battery. This type of detonator consists of a switch with two positions, "Test" and "On". In the "Test" position, pressure on the button on the battery side lights up a red indicator light. In this position no power flows from the contacts to the detonator. However, in the "On" position the same procedure causes the red indicator to light and causes power to flow from the contacts to the detonator.

40. The transmitter described by the Libyan Senoussi Abdelsalam as a "receiver/tape recorder", and which was subsequently confiscated by security forces, was to serve as a remote control system. Both the transmitter and the receiver used for the bomb are made of ordinary, commercially available electronic components to be found in any communications system. However, sophisticated modifications converted these intrinsically harmless components into instruments of death.

41. In order to achieve detonation, the components of this bomb were cleverly modified in a laboratory and skilfully assembled. The bomb was made in such a way that it could be set off from a distance of several kilometres. The duped Chadian, Ali Hassan, would certainly have been blown up along with his so-called "eavesdropping device", which he was supposed to have placed in the meeting room in the Chamber of Commerce, thereby also wiping out the chief witness against the terrorist Colonel.

42. The provenance of the operational parts of the Libyan device has been traced to a commercial source in Western Europe that has over the past six years supplied several such parts to the Libyan Government at Benghazi. From the ongoing investigations, it appears that 15 or more sets of such components have been delivered to the Office of Military Security, Post Office Box 724, Benghazi, Libya. The 14—or more—missing sets or components could therefore still be assembled for bombs already planted on the African continent, or elsewhere, by the arch-international terrorist Qaddafi.

43. I would point out that the specific technical details of the bomb have been deliberately omitted in order not to facilitate the manufacture of similar devices by other terrorist organizations.

44. Based on the evidence provided by depositions of the witness and technical analyses, the Government of Chad accuses the Government of Libya of having fomented this act of cowardly terrorism in order to assassinate the President of the Republic of Chad and members of the Chadian Government.

45. In the light of the foregoing, the Government of Chad appeals to all the States Members of the Organization resolutely to condemn this criminal plot fomented by the international terrorist Qaddafi.

46. I wish to take this opportunity to alert all nations to the fact that Chad and its leaders are not the only targets

for the agents of Qaddafi's international terrorism, as we have already seen elsewhere. We know that there are at least 14 additional sophisticated explosive devices still in circulation. That is why we are hopeful that our statement will assist in identifying, and perhaps even discovering, additional bombs before they can achieve their gruesome goals on behalf of the Libyan campaign of terror.

47. At the request of the Soviet Union and through the aegis of the First Committee, the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session has just held a very lengthy debate on State terrorism. The United Nations now finds itself confronted with a concrete case of terrorism. What will the Security Council decide?

48. For its part, the Chadian Government hopes that by providing this data, supported by photographs, it will have made some modest contribution to the efforts of the international community to foil acts of international terrorism in general, and those of Qaddafi in particular.

49. The disarmed weapon I have described is available for examination to those having a legitimate interest and to accredited media representatives. We did not bring the plastic explosive itself because it would have been dangerous both to us and to the aircraft, but we do have the detonator with us in the attaché case I am now placing at your disposal. But there is no need for alarm—you will not be blown up. However, before opening the case, I would ask the technicians to start the videotape screens so that we can all see what this bomb would have done had it gone off. Of course, this is a simulation, since we are not ourselves terrorists.

50. This is the attaché case, which looks like one for a businessman or a diplomat, apart from the murderous device it contains.

The following is an interpretation of the narration, in French, of the videotapes shown in the Security Council chamber at the request of the delegation of Chad.

"Last autumn President Habré was to have held a meeting with members of his Government, senior officials and other prominent citizens and foreign diplomats in the meeting hall of the Chamber of Commerce in downtown N'Djamena. At that time, a Libyan agent calling himself El Senoussi Abdelsalam contacted a Chadian businessman who had free access to the building in question. The Libyan instructed the businessman to place this harmless-looking attaché case inside the conference room of the Chamber of Commerce. He said that the attaché case contained only an eavesdropping and recording device that would enable the Libyan to follow these very high-level discussions. Instead of an eavesdropping device, however, the attaché case in fact contained six sticks of Czechoslovak-made Semtex-H plastic explosive. For some years Semtex-H has been the preferred explosive of terrorists, particularly in the manufacture of booby-trapped letters. Eduardo Mondlane, the Mozambican patriot, was killed by a booby-trapped package containing this type of explosive. The 15 kilos of explosives in this bomb could have completely destroyed every human being within a 130-metre radius.

"In a closed room such as this room in which the Security Council is meeting, the effect of the blast would have been greatly amplified. The explosion would have destroyed the conference room and blown everyone in it to bits. Embedded in the dangerous plastic explosive was a detonator bearing the serial number 13. The test button on top made it possible to check that the batteries and contacts were in working order.

"Here is the detonator in a dismantled state. Its receiver, cleverly modified through equipment that is easily obtainable from commercial sources, functions with ordinary batteries. When the position of the test button is 'On' or 'Testing', the mechanism picks up a radio signal which detonates the explosives hidden in the plastic sticks. The remote control can be situated several hundred metres away from the target. It is contained in this ordinary attaché case, which has been ingeniously transformed for the purpose. It has been discovered that the transmitter in this attaché case, apparently harmless in appearance, was capable of sending signals to detonate five separate bombs. The transmitter is powered by a rechargeable battery and has a collapsible aerial. The Libyan agent Senoussi presented the attaché case to his presumed accomplice as containing eavesdropping equipment. All that had to be done was to press the button on the transmitter and the signal would have been given to the detonator of the bomb, thus killing President Hissein Habré and other high-ranking persons in the Republic of Chad. This is what would have happened: [*EXPLOSION*]."

51. The PRESIDENT: (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Chad.

52. Mr. LASSOU (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): We have here some brochures we have prepared containing various photographs we have taken. We would be glad if you, Sir, could kindly arrange to have them distributed as official documents of the Security Council.

53. The PRESIDENT: (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on whom I now call.

54. Mr. AZZAROUK (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): It gives me great pleasure at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your accession to the presidency of the Council for this month. I am confident that your diplomatic experience and your wisdom will assist the Council in its deliberations.

55. I also wish to express my appreciation to your predecessor, our brother the representative of Egypt, for the exemplary manner in which he conducted the work of the Council last month.

56. The position of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with regard to the situation in Chad has been made clear in the brief letter we addressed to the President of the Council on

28 January [*S/16912*]. Despite the fact that we have from the outset made it clear that there is no logical justification for the convening of the Council—and we are now sure of that following the statement made a few moments ago—I wish to make certain observations to shed light on the truth of the situation prevailing in Chad.

57. In this connection, I wish to assert that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya rejects all the allegations included in the letter of Chad [*S/16906*]—and all that has been said by Mr. Gouara Lassou in the last few minutes. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya does not interfere in Chad and has no presence whatsoever on Chadian territory. What is described every now and again by some hostile circles as a presence of Libyan forces is only the presence of forces of the legitimate Government of National Unity which are stationed in the northern part of Chad.

58. Therefore the purpose of the rebel Habré in convening this meeting of the Council is as follows: first, to slander the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to depict it as an aggressor and to cast doubt on its intentions towards Chad; secondly, to belittle the military importance and power of the Government of National Unity, under Oueddei, which controls the northern part of Chad and whose forces are present throughout the country; thirdly, to create justification for the rebel Habré and his clique to obtain more weapons, foreign forces and mercenaries to use in acts of repression and massacre against the Chadian people and to exploit the situation by attacking the forces of the Government of National Unity in the north of the country; fourthly, to give legitimacy to the rebel régime in N'Djamena, a legitimacy which it cannot obtain through the people.

59. Hissein Habré and his representatives talk about security, peace and stability in Chad and try to convince world public opinion that they are in favour of that while the facts indicate the opposite. Hissein Habré has always been a source of disturbance and instability in Chad, and he is primarily responsible for the plight of the Chadian people over the last seven years, that is to say, since the coming of the Chadian National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) to N'Djamena.

60. Hissein Habré history from then on is replete with acts of insurgency and crimes and massacres committed against the Chadian people. It is difficult to give an account here of all the breaches of peace and security he has committed. I will merely refer to the fact that he plunged the country into a period of long civil war by his rebellion against the Government of Félix Malloum, after having signed an agreement through which he was able to enter the Government and assume the post of Prime Minister on 31 August 1978. He also violated the Kano Agreement of 16 March 1979. He also tried to usurp power, and this led to the continuation and escalation of the civil war. Finally, he violated the Lagos Accord on National Reconciliation in Chad, of 18 August 1979 [*S/14378, annex I*] by rebelling against the legitimate interim Government of National Unity headed by Goukouni Oueddei, the result of the Lagos Accord, after he assumed the position of Defence Minister in that Government, the only one set up as a result of agreement among all factions in Chad and after strenuous efforts by the neighbouring countries, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The Lagos Agreement was signed by the 11 Chadian factions and led to the formation of the Government recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

61. It has not been enough for Hissein Habré and his clique to subvert security and cause instability in Chad whenever they realize that the country has attained some kind of stability and embarked on construction. They have also impeded all efforts by the OAU and African countries to achieve national reconciliation and restore peace, stability and legitimacy to Chad, a country which has been torn apart by civil war for two decades. Famine and the crimes of Hissein Habré have eliminated many and prompted some to seek asylum in neighbouring countries, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which hosts tens of thousands of Chadian refugees and gives them all humanitarian assistance.

62. Hissein Habré impeded all efforts at conciliation between the warring factions in Chad; for example, he foiled the initiative by President Mengistu, then Chairman of the OAU, to hold a reconciliation conference at Addis Ababa, as well as the initiative of the President of Angola to hold a reconciliation conference in Brazzaville, by insisting on his recognition as Head of State by the other Chadian factions and by the legitimate Government of Chad, headed by Goukouni Oueddei. That is something that was rejected by Hissein Habré himself previously at the Kano conference on national reconciliation, when he insisted on the resignation of Félix Malloum, then President of Chad, as a condition for the holding of that conference. His insistence on a condition that he had previously rejected confirms his lack of desire to achieve peace and confirms that his objective is to continue the civil war and to eliminate the Chadian people in order that he may remain in power.

63. The army, headed by Hissein Habré, who has sent a representative to address us here, represents only one of 11 factions that signed the Lagos Accord. Therefore, the international community should not be deceived and cannot give legitimacy to a Government formed of only one faction, which came to power through rebellion and force of arms, with the support of mercenary and foreign forces.

64. It is no wonder that such a Government, in view of the way in which it came to power, faces such resistance by the Chadian people, under its legitimate Government. It is no wonder either that there is an attempt on the life of Hissein Habré and his clique, which had previously rebelled against legitimacy and usurped power, especially when that clique does not control the majority of the country, faces armed opposition and continuous military operations in the south and has no influence in the northern part of the country, which is controlled by the legitimate Government. This confirms that the allegation that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya concocted an attempt to assassinate Hissein Habré is without foundation. What is more likely is what was said in the statement issued by the legitimate Chadian Government of National Unity, published at Brussels, that the assassination attempt just mentioned by Habré's representative was made by a group in Hissein Habré's personal guard. The note that was presented a

while ago by the representative of the rebel Habré is but a pack of fabricated allegations and does not require any response.

65. The rebel Hissein Habré and his clique have no legitimacy and have no support among the Chadian people. What is going on in Chad is a civil war, which has been raging for 20 years, due to elements such as Hissein Habré, who put their personal aspirations before the interests of the Chadian people. The attempt to divert the attention of the international community from what has been going on in Chad, by levelling allegations against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya at the instigation of the imperialist forces, will not solve the Chadian problem. The only solution is to seek national reconciliation in accordance with the Lagos Accord, under the supervision of the OAU and with the participation of all the parties that signed the Accord. The continuation of support for the rebellion headed by Hissein Habré and the disregard of legitimacy can increase the tension, bloodletting and destruction in Chad.

66. The present situation in Chad is shown by the presence of a legitimate Government of National Unity under Goukouni Oueddei, which controls the majority of the country and which has its seat in the north, and there is a Government of rebellion—if we may call it a Government—which controls N'Djamena, with the support of some foreign forces. That should be taken into consideration when a solution to the Chadian problem is sought.

67. The Libyan people is linked to the brotherly Chadian people by historical, geographical, cultural and spiritual ties. The two countries have a common history of struggle against colonialism. When the two peoples were subjected to colonialism at the beginning of the present century they fought together. The Libyans fought against colonialism in Chad and the Chadians fought in Libya against the Italian Fascist colonialism and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has been keen on maintaining this special relationship, which ties the two peoples together. It has consistently endeavoured to maintain the unity, security and stability of the Chadian people. It was the first to strive to achieve national reconciliation in Chad and put an end to the plight of the Chadian people since the early 1960s; the first national reconciliation conference was held in the city of Sebha in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in February 1978. The Libyan efforts resulted later in the mutual recognition of FROLINAT and the Chadian Government at the conference of Sebha and Benghazi in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on 27 March 1978. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has also participated in all conferences held in Nigeria since then with the objective of achieving national reconciliation, which resulted in the Lagos Accord and the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity, which comprises all Chadian factions, under Goukouni Oueddei, and which has been recognized by the OAU.

68. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, as a sister neighbouring country, is ready to contribute, as it has already done, to any efforts made within the framework of the OAU to achieve peace and security in Chad.

69. In conclusion, allow me to say that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has continuously emphasized its keen interest in preserving the unity and independence of Chad. However, we shall likewise preserve the unity of our soil, whatever the price. The reference by the representative of the army of the north to part of the Libyan territories is something that we cannot accept. I assert here also that the so-called Aouzou Strip is an integral part of Libyan territory, which we inherited from Italian colonialism to the map attached to the report of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya, Adrian Belt, on the basis of which the decision establishing the independence of Libya was made. The map appears in the records of the General Assembly[1]. The map referred to by the representative of Hissein Habré is a copy of the map included in that document. It is before me now, and anyone who wishes to do so may look at it to see whether the Strip is Libyan or Chadian.

70. The PRESIDENT: (*interpretation from French*): As President of the Council, I should like to remind the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya that the complaint we are considering comes from the internationally recognized Government of Chad and that its legitimacy cannot be challenged in the Council. It was at the request of that Government that the President of the Council, speaking on behalf of its members, made known in his statement of 6 April 1983 [*2430th meeting, para. 4*] the recommendations of the Security Council regarding the settlement of the dispute between Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

71. The representative of Chad wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply. I call upon him.

72. Mr. KESSELY (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): The delegation of Chad does not wish to exercise its right of reply knowing full well that Libya's response will be just a pack of lies and contain baseless allegations. However, we would simply say that the killer never admits his crime unless one really is dealing with a good loser—but that is not the case here.

73. The Chadian people has suffered far too much from Libya's acts, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country has just shown. In this particular case, we should merely like to give the international community an opportunity to judge for itself.

74. The PRESIDENT: (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I call upon him.

75. Mr. AZZAROUK (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. President, with all due respect for the remarks you made a while ago, I should like here to affirm that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya does not recognize the government of insurgency in N'Djamena and never will recognize it.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

NOTE

[1] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 15*, document A/1340.

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